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A CHARACTERIZATION OF “PHELPSIAN”
STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION
CHRISTOPHER P. CHAMBERS AND FEDERICO ECHENIQUE
Abstract. We establish that statistical discrimination is possi-
ble if and only if it is impossible to uniquely identify the signal
structure observed by an employer from a realized empirical dis-
tribution of skills. The impossibility of statistical discrimination is
shown to be equivalent to the existence of a fair, skill-dependent,
remuneration for workers. Finally, we connect the statistical dis-
crimination literature to Bayesian persuasion, establishing that if
discrimination is absent, then the optimal signaling problem results
in a linear payoff function (as well as a kind of converse).
1. Introduction
In seminal contributions, Arrow (1971; 1973) and Phelps (1972) pos-
tulated that discrimination along racial lines, or gender identities, can
have a statistical explanation. In this note we focus on Phelps’ no-
tion of statistical discrimination: on the idea that two populations of
workers, who are in essence identical, may have different economic re-
munerations for purely informational reasons.1
Phelps’ theory connects worker remuneration with the distribution of
signals that can be observed about worker skills. Phelps assumes a firm
who observes a signal about the underlying skills of a worker. The firm
observes the signal before assigning the worker to a task. The worker
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1 We follow the interpretation of Phelps’ model due to Aigner and Cain (1977).
Arrow’s theory of statistical discrimination relies on a coordination failure, and
is quite different from Phelps’. Statistical discrimination stands in contrast with
taste-based discrimination, as in Becker (1957).
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is paid her expected contribution to the firm, conditional on the firm’s
observed signal about the worker. (A competitive market ensures that
workers are paid their contributions.) Consider now two populations
of workers: group A and group B. If the signal is more informative
for As than for Bs, then (the argument goes), a worker from group A
may be ex-ante more valuable to the firm than a B worker. This is
because the additional information about the A worker may be used
to better assign her a task matching her skills. Even more, the signal
may be the result of a test that has been designed with a population
from group A in mind. The signal implemented by the test will then
be more informative about the skills of a prospective A worker than a
B worker.2
As a consequence of the difference in informativeness, the firm may
value a group A worker over a group B worker. We formulate the theory
of statistical discrimination using the language of the recent literature
on informational design. A firm observes a signal about a worker’s
skills, and bases both the assigned task and the payment to the worker
on the revenue it expects to gain from the action taken by the worker
at the firm. A group of workers comes with a distribution over signals:
an information structure. The distribution over signals of group A may
be more informative than the distribution over signals of group B. We
say that statistical discrimination is present if two groups of workers,
each group having their distinct distribution over signals, but the same
distribution of skills, receive different payments in expectation.
Our contribution is to connect statistical discrimination with two
seemingly distinct properties of the economic environment: one is iden-
tification (in the econometric sense) of signals from skills, and the other
is the linearity of firm revenue in “fair” skill-dependent payoffs. First,
we show that the absence of statistical discrimination is equivalent to
2As an example, Aigner and Cain cite evidence from the education literature to
the effect that the SAT is less informative about the abilities of African-American
students than it is for white students.
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the econometric identification of signals. Specifically, we prove that sta-
tistical discrimination is not possible if and only if every given distribu-
tion of skills arises from a unique distribution of signals. By definition,
when discrimination is possible, the identification property must be vi-
olated. Our contribution is in the converse: whenever identification is
impossible, discrimination can arise.
Second, we show that identification, and therefore the absence of
discrimination, is equivalent to the existence of a fair skill-based remu-
neration for workers. Workers’ payments are a linear combination of
the fair remunerations. Each list of skills must be associated with a
value, which is independent of any signals, and every worker is paid
the expectation according to the distribution of skills inherent in her
realized signal.
Finally, we show that the optimal information structure in the sense
of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) achieves precisely the fair remuner-
ation in our results.
2. The model
2.1. Notation. A set is binary it is has one or two elements. If A is a
closed subset of a Euclidean space, we denote by ∆(A) the set of Borel
probability measures on A.
2.2. The model. The model involves a firm and a worker. The firm
faces uncertainty over the revenues it can obtain from the worker’s
actions. The firm’s revenue depends on the worker’s skills, and how
those skills match up with the technology of the firm.
Let Θ denote a finite set of uncertain states of the world ; these
states represent the skill set of the worker, and are unknown to the
firm. The firm asks the worker to undertake some action, and it only
cares about the state-contingent payoff that results from the worker’s
action. Formally, then, an action is an element a ∈ RΘ. Thus, the
task of the firm is to properly match a worker to an action with the
appropriate skill set.
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There is a closed set of signals, or payoff-relevant types, S ⊆ ∆(Θ).
Here we identify signals with the posterior distribution that they induce
over Θ. The firm observes s ∈ S before asking the worker to undertake
an action. Thus, the goal of the firm is to choose the appropriate
action for the appropriate worker, after a signal of worker skill has
been observed.
The firm solves the following problem. For a given s ∈ S, and finite
set of actions A,
vA(s) ≡ max
a∈A
∑
θ∈Θ
a(θ)s(θ).
Given signal s ∈ S, vA(s) is the maximal expected revenue the em-
ployer can achieve. We maintain the assumption that labor markets
are competitive, and therefore a worker of type s is paid the revenue
vA(s) that she generates for the firm. This is as in Phelps (1972) and
Aigner and Cain (1977). Observe that vA is the “value function” of A,
as in Blackwell (1953) or Machina (1984), and is thus always convex.
A probability pi ∈ ∆(S) is an information structure. It induces a
probability over Θ via: ppi(θ) =
∫
S
s(θ)dpi(s). For a set E ⊆ S, we can
interpret pi(E) as an empirical frequency of individuals who generate
signals s ∈ E. The empirical frequency pi then generates an empirical
frequency of skills, which is ppi.
We say that the set of signals S is non-discriminatory if for any
information structures pi, pi′ ∈ ∆(S), and any finite set A ⊆ RΘ, if
ppi = ppi′, then ∫
S
vA(t)dpi(t) =
∫
S
vA(t)dpi
′(t).
Interpret pi(E) as the frequency of individuals of type E ⊆ S. Under
the competitive markets assumption, the set S being non-discriminatory
means that the average remuneration paid to a class of workers with dis-
tribution pi ultimately depends only on the distribution of their skills.
2.3. Motivation and a Phelpsian example. We start by a simple
example to recreate the point made by Phelps (1972). It is a min-
imal example; the simplest we can think of that delivers the Phelp-
sian message. Let Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3} be the set of states, and A =
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{(1, 0, 0), (0, 1/2, 3))} be the set of available actions. Observe that
with this specification, workers are not “high” or “low” quality, but
they simply have differing aptitudes for the available actions.
Suppose that
S = {(1, 0, 0), (1/2, 1/2, 0), (0, 1/2, 1/2), (0, 0, 1)}
is the set of signals, or worker types.
Consider two information structures, pi and pi′, described in the table
below, together with the profit function vA resulting from our assumed
Θ and A:
t = (1, 0, 0) t = (1/2, 1/2, 0) t = (0, 1/2, 1/2) t = (0, 0, 1)
pi(t) 1/3 0 2/3 0
pi′(t) 0 2/3 0 1/3
vA(t) 1 1/2 7/4 3
There are two populations of workers, say A and B. The two popula-
tions differ in the information that the firm obtains about their skills.
The workers might take a test, as in Phelps (1972), and the informa-
tional content of the test might be different for the two populations. So
As emit signals about their skills as given by pi, while Bs distribution
over signals is pi′. Observe that ppi = ppi′ = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), reflecting
that the populations overall have the same skills.
A worker from group A reveals that she is either good for action
a1 = (1, 0, 0) or action a2 = (0, 1/3, 3). The B worker reveals the same
kind of information, but less efficiently: a signal t = (1/2, 1/2, 0) tells
the employer that a1 is the optimal choice given the information at
hand, but leaves the employer with some doubts as to whether a2 may
have been the optimal action. In consequence, we have∫
T
vA(t)dpi(t) = 1/3 + 7/6 > 1/3 + 1 =
∫
T
vA(t)dpi
′(t).
If workers are paid according to the revenues that they contribute to
the firm, as would be the case in a competitive market, then A workers
are paid more than B workers in aggregate. The differences in expected
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(or population) remuneration between the two is purely a consequence
of the informational content in their corresponding signal structures.
In our example of Phelpsian statistical discrimination, the two dif-
ferent information structures have the same mean. This is a necessary
requirement for the existence of statistical discrimination. It is impor-
tant to point out, however, that skill can always be inferred from wages,
even when there is discrimination. We present Proposition 1 to make
this point.
For a set of actions A = {a1, . . . , an}, and action k, let A + k =
{a1 + k, . . . , an + k}.
Proposition 1. For any S and any set of actions A, if pi, pi′ ∈ ∆(S)
for which ppi 6= ppi′, then there is k for which∫
T
vA+k(t)dpi(t) 6=
∫
T
vA+k(t)dpi
′(t).
2.4. When discrimination is impossible. Our discussion suggests
that discrimination is tied to identification. Skills are always identified
from payoffs, even when there is discrimination (Proposition 1). The
problem is the converse identification: Here we show that the absence of
discrimination is equivalent to the ability to estimate skills from signals.
Importantly, we show that this can only happen when payments are
linear in signals. So the absence of discrimination is equivalent to
the existence of a state-dependent, signal-independent, “fair” payoff.
Payments equal the expected value of such a payoff, and are called fair
valuations.
We say that S
• is identified if for any pi, pi′ ∈ ∆(S), if ppi = ppi′, then pi = pi
′;
• admits fair valuations if for any finite subset A ⊆ RΘ, there is
αA ∈ R
Θ for which for all t ∈ S,
vA(t) =
∑
θ
αA(θ)t(θ).
• admits fair valuations for binary sets if for any binary subset
A ⊆ RΘ, there is αA ∈ R
Θ for which for all t ∈ S, vA(t) =∑
θ αA(θ)t(θ).
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The notion that S admits fair valuations captures the idea that any
individual is paid according to her expected skill. Thus, for A, αA(θ)
represents the value to the firm with technology A of skill set θ ∈ Θ,
and if an individual sends signal s then she is paid the expected value
of αA according to s. Importantly, if pi ∈ ∆(S), then∫
vA(s)dpi(s) = αA ·
∫
sdpi(s) = αA · ppi.
So, under fair valuations, the expected payment to a population of
agents with information structure pi only depends on the distribution
of skills in that population.
Finally, say that S is non-discriminatory for binary sets if for any
pi, pi′ ∈ ∆(S) and any binary A ⊆ RΘ, if ppi = ppi′, then∫
S
vA(t)dpi(t) =
∫
S
vA(t)dpi
′(t).
Theorem 2. The following are equivalent.
(1) S is non-discriminatory.
(2) S is non-discriminatory for binary sets.
(3) S is identified.
(4) S admits fair valuations.
(5) S admits fair valuations for binary sets.
The main import of Theorem 2 is that there is a αA, independent of
the signal s, so that the optimal contribution of the worker to the firm
is the expected value of αA. The worker is therefore remunerated ac-
cording to some “fundamental” value αA, and receives the expectation
of αA according to the signal s.
Proposition 3. If S admits fair valuations, then for each finite A ⊆
RΘ and corresponding αA ∈ R
Θ, we have for every s∗ ∈ S:∑
θ
αA(θ)s
∗(θ) = inf{
∑
θ
y(θ)s∗(θ) : y ∈ RΘ and vA(s) ≤
∑
θ
y(θ)s(θ)∀s ∈ S}.
Proposition 3 means that the value of a worker with type s∗ to the
firm is the minimum expected payment that guarantees the worker
a payoff of at least vA(s), for all signals s ∈ S. This is a kind of
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participation, or individual rationality, constraint. The worker may be
able to guarantee a payment of vA(s) on the market, if her signal is s,
and thus a firm must guarantee at least vA(s) in its choice of the “fair”
payoff αA ∈ R
Θ.
2.5. Connection to Bayesian persuasion. The recent literature on
Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) deals with the
optimal design of information structures. It turns out that the value
of optimal information design is linear if and only if S admits no dis-
crimination.
We now focus a bit more in depth on the notion of signal structure.
As in Blackwell (1953), there is a natural notion of “comparative in-
formativeness” for pi, pi′ ∈ ∆(S). We say that pi is more informative
than pi′ if for every A,
∫
vA(t)dpi(t) ≥
∫
vA(t)dpi
′(t). Most economists
will have heard of the notion of a “mean-preserving spread;” pi turns
out to be more informative than pi′ if it consists of a mean-preserving
spread of pi′.
We know that optimal information design will never utilize signal
structures that are dominated according to the more informativeness
order. As a result, optimal information structures will place probability
zero on signals that can be obtained as the mean of other signals.
Formally, an optimal information structure will have support on the
extreme points of the convex hull of S.
Now, let T be the closed convex hull of S. An information structure
is any probability measure pi ∈ ∆(T ). Then define WA : T → R via
WA(s) ≡ max{
∫
T
vA(s˜)dpi(s˜) : pi ∈ ∆(T ) and s =
∫
T
s˜dpi(s˜)}.
WA(s) is the value of an optimal information structure for a population
with skill distribution s. In the following, ∂T denotes the extreme
points of T ; those points which are not convex combinations of other
points in T .
Return to our motivating “Phelpsian” example. There, discrimina-
tion was present even though S consisted of the extreme points of its
convex hull T , and thus S was maximally informative. Phelps’ original
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point can thus be refined: discrimination obtains because an employer
has “different” information about two classes of individuals, rather than
“better” information.
Let us see how this manifests itself in the choice of optimal infor-
mation structure. In this case, for each s ∈ S, we have (clearly)
WA(s) = vA(s), as each s is extreme in the convex hull of T . We
therefore obtain: (2/3)WA(1/2, 1/2, 0) + (1/3)WA(0, 0, 1) =
4
3
< 3
2
=
(1/3)vA(1, 0, 0) + (2/3)vA(0, 1/2, 1/2) ≤ WA(1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
Hence, WA is nonlinear in this case. This is a general artifact of
non-identification and discrimination, as is evidenced by the following
result.
Corollary 4. For any S, ∂T is non-discriminatory iff for every A,
WA is affine (linear).
3
As in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011),WA is always weakly concave,
which admits the possibility that it is affine. Corollary 4 says that
discrimination is possible exactly when WA exhibits strict concavities.
3. Conclusion
We have formulated Phelps’ theory of statistical discrimination us-
ing the modern language of information design. Our results shed new
light on the nature of discrimination, and on some of the empirical
approaches one might take to establish the existence of statistical dis-
crimination.
Statistical discrimination turns out to be equivalent to the absence
of econometric identification of signals from skills. While the identifi-
cation of skills from salaries is always possible, even in the presence of
discrimination, we show that the crucial identification property is that
of signals from skills.
In second place, we connect discrimination with the source of worker
remunerations. We show that identification is impossible if and only if
3Because the domain of WA is a set of probability measures, WA is linear if it is
affine. In fact, in this case we have WA(s) =
∑
θ∈Θ
αA(θ)s(θ), where αA is as in
Proposition 3.
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remunerations are linear in “fair” skill-dependent, signal-independent,
payoffs.
Our results have immediate consequences for empirical research on
discrimination. They imply that discrimination is absent if and only if
empirical approaches to linearly estimating fair skills-based payoffs are
viable.
4. Proofs
Let T be the closed convex hull of S. Recall that ∂T denotes the
extreme points of T . The definition of vA extends to T . Let YA : T → R
be the concave envelope of vA, defined as the pointwise infimum of the
affine functions that dominate vA. So if A(T ) denotes the space of all
affine functions on T , then vA(t) = inf{l(t) : l ∈ A(T ) and vA ≤ l}.
Recall the definition of WA from Section 2.5.
Lemma 5. YA =WA
Proof. Let l : T → R be an affine function and vA ≤ l. For any
pi ∈ ∆(T ) with
∫
T
qdpi(q) = p,∫
T
vA(q)dpi(q) ≤
∫
T
l(q)dpi(q) = l
(∫
T
qdpi(q)
)
= l(p),
as l is affine. Thus WA ≤ l, as pi was arbitrary. This implies that
WA ≤ YA, as l was arbitrary.
Now suppose that WA(p) < YA(p). Recall that WA is concave. Then
the set D = {(q, y) ∈ T×R : y ≤WA(q)} is closed and convex, so there
exists α with (q, y) · α ≤ (p,WA(p)) · α < (p, y
′) · α for all (q, y) ∈ D
and all y′ ≥ YA(p). Write α = (α
1, α2) ∈ RΘ ×R. Clearly we cannot
have α2 = 0 as (p,WA(p) ∈ D. Consider the affine function l : T → R
defined by
q 7→ (1/α2)((p,WA(p)) · α− α
1 · q).
This means that l(p) = WA(p) < YA(p). Moreover, for any q ∈ T ,
α · (q,WA(q)) ≤ α · (p,WA(p)); hence,
l(q) = (1/α2)α1 · p+WA(p)− (1/α
2)α1 · q ≥WA(q) ≥ vA(q),
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where the last inequality follows from the definition of WA. Then l ∈
A(T ), vA ≤ l, and l(p) < YA(p); a contradiction. 
4.1. Proof of Theorem 2. By the Choquet-Meyer Theorem (Theo-
rem II.3.7 in Alfsen (2012) or p. 56-57 in Phelps (2000)), T is a simplex
iff ∂T is identified.
Now, to prove the theorem: it is obvious that 3 =⇒ 1 =⇒ 2. We
shall prove that 2 =⇒ 3. To this end, let S be non-discriminatory for
binary menus. The proof that 2 =⇒ 3 has two parts. The first is to
show that S = ∂T . The second is that T must be a simplex.
First, it is obvious by definition of T that ∂T ⊆ S. So we prove that
S ⊆ ∂T . To this end, suppose by means of contradiction that there is
s∗ ∈ S for which there are t, t′ ∈ T , t 6= t′, and γ ∈ (0, 1) for which
s∗ = γt + (1 − γ)t′. Let f = (s∗ − t) + [t · s∗ − s∗ · s∗]1 and g = −f .
Observe that f · s∗ = 0, g · t = −t · (s∗ − t) − s∗ · (t − s∗) > 0 and
f · t′ = (s∗ − t) · (t′ − s∗) = γ(1− γ)(t′ − s∗) · (t′ − s∗) > 0.
Let A ≡ {f, g}. Then we obtain that vA(t) ≥ g · t > 0, vA(t
′) ≥
f · t′ > 0, while vA(s
∗) = 0 (as f · s∗ = g · s∗ = 0).
Now, for each of t, t′, there are finitely supported (by Caratheodory’s
theorem) pit and pit′ on ∂T (so in particular on S) for which t =∫
S
sdpi(s) and t′ =
∫
S
sdpi′(s). This means that
∫
S
vA(s)dpi(s) ≥ vA(t) >
0 and
∫
S
vA(s)dpi
′(s) ≥ vA(t
′) > 0, as vA is convex. Then∫
S
vA(s)d(γpi + (1− γ)pi
′)(s) > 0.
But this contradicts 2 as
∫
S
sd(γpi+ (1− γ)pi′)(s) = γt+ (1− γ)t′ = s∗
and vA(s
∗) = 0.
So we have shown that S = ∂T , and we turn to the proof that T
is a simplex (and thus S identified). By Alfsen (2012) Theorem II.4.1,
since T is convex and compact, T is a simplex if and only if A(T ) forms
a lattice in the usual (pointwise) ordering on functions. So, suppose by
means of contradiction that A(T ) does not form a lattice. Then, there
are f, g ∈ A(T ) which possess no supremum in A(T ).
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Lemma 6. Let f, g ∈ A(T ). For any z ∈ ∂T , if f(z) ≥ g(z), then
there is h ∈ A(T ) for which h ≥ f, g and h(z) = f(z).
Proof. Let M be the subgraph of the concave envelope of v{f,g}. Ob-
serve by definition that it is the convex hull of the points {(z, v{f,g}) :
z ∈ S}, so that it is polyhedral (Corollary 19.I.2 of Rockafellar (1970)).
Therefore, by definition of polyhedral concave function, there is h sup-
porting it at (z, f(z)). 
From Lemma 6, and the fact that f and g possess no supremum
in A(T ), it follows that there is no affine function h for which for
all z ∈ ∂T , h(z) = max{f(z), g(z)}. Consequently, if A ≡ {f, g},
then YA is not affine, since for all z ∈ ∂T , it follows that YA(z) =
max{f(z), g(z)} = vA(z). Now, YA being concave and not affine means
that there is pˆi ∈ ∆(T ) with
∫
S
YA(q)dpˆi(q) < YA(ppˆi). Since S = ∂T ,
and YA is concave, we can in fact find (by Lemma 4.1 in Phelps (2000))
pi ∈ ∆(S) with ppˆi = ppi and∫
S
vA(q)dpi(q) =
∫
S
YA(q)dpi(q) ≤
∫
S
YA(q)dpˆi(q) < YA(ppˆi) = YA(ppi),
where the first equality follows from vA(q) = YA(q) for q ∈ S, and the
second inequality from the choice of pi.
Now, by Lemma 5, YA(ppi) = sup{
∫
vA(q)dp˜i(q) : p˜i ∈ ∆(T ) and pp˜i =
ppi}. Then there is pi
′ ∈ ∆(S) (as the sup is achieved for a measure with
support in ∂T = S) with ppi = ppi′ and
∫
S
vA(q)dpi(q) <
∫
S
vA(q)dpi
′(q),
contradicting the fact that S is non-discriminatory for binary menus.
4.2. Proof of Proposition 3. The Lagrangian for the maximization
problem in the definition of WA is
L(pi, λ) =
∫
T
vA(t)dpi(t) + λ ·
[
p−
∫
T
qdpi(q)
]
= λ · p+
∫
T
(vA(t)− λ · p)dpi(t)
and apply the maximin theorem (see for example Theorem 6.2.7 in
Aubin and Ekeland (2006), which applies here because ∆(T ) is com-
pact).
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4.3. Proof of Proposition 1. Observe that for any A and any action
l, we have vA+l(t) = vA(t) + l · t. Now, since ppi 6= ppi′, there is l for
which l · ppi 6= l · ppi′ . Consequently, there is α for which:
αl · (ppi − ppi′) 6=
∫
T
vA(t)dpi
′(t)−
∫
T
vA(t)dpi(t).
Let k = αl, and conclude that:∫
T
vA+k(t)dpi(t) = k·ppi+
∫
T
vA(t)dpi(t) 6= k·ppi′+
∫
T
vA(t)dpi
′(t) =
∫
T
vA+k(t)dpi
′(t).
4.4. Proof of Corollary 4. By the Choquet-Meyers Theorem (The-
orem II.3.7 in Alfsen (2012)) T is a simplex iff the concave envelope
of every lower semicontinuous and convex function is affine. Clearly,
when S is identified, T is a simplex, and since vA is convex and lower
semicontinuous, we obtain that WA = YA, the concave envelope. So
WA is affine.
Conversely, suppose that WA is affine for each finite A. We will
show that T is a simplex (so that ∂T forms the vertices of a simplex,
and is identified). But this again follows from the fact that WA is the
smallest concave function on T dominating each a ∈ A. Since it is
affine, it follows that A(T ) is a lattice, and hence T is a simplex.
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